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Last-minute updates for release notes.
Security: CVE-2024-10976, CVE-2024-10977, CVE-2024-10978, CVE-2024-10979
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‎doc/src/sgml/release-12.sgml

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<listitem>
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<!--
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Author: Nathan Bossart <nathan@postgresql.org>
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Branch: master [cd7ab5753] 2024-11-11 09:00:00 -0600
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Branch: REL_17_STABLE [edcda9bb4] 2024-11-11 09:00:00 -0600
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Branch: REL_16_STABLE [562289460] 2024-11-11 09:00:00 -0600
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Branch: REL_15_STABLE [6db5ea8de] 2024-11-11 09:00:00 -0600
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Branch: REL_14_STABLE [4e51030af] 2024-11-11 09:00:00 -0600
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Branch: REL_13_STABLE [952ff31e2] 2024-11-11 09:00:00 -0600
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Branch: REL_12_STABLE [448525e8a] 2024-11-11 09:00:00 -0600
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-->
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<para>
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Ensure cached plans are marked as dependent on the calling role when
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RLS applies to a non-top-level table reference (Nathan Bossart)
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<ulink url="&commit_baseurl;448525e8a">&sect;</ulink>
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</para>
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<para>
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If a CTE, subquery, sublink, security invoker view, or coercion
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projection in a query references a table with row-level security
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policies, we neglected to mark the resulting plan as potentially
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dependent on which role is executing it. This could lead to later
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query executions in the same session using the wrong plan, and then
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returning or hiding rows that should have been hidden or returned
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instead.
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</para>
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<para>
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The <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> Project thanks
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Wolfgang Walther for reporting this problem.
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(CVE-2024-10976)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<!--
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Author: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
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Branch: master [bf8835ea9] 2024-11-11 10:19:52 +0900
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Branch: REL_17_STABLE [a5cc4c667] 2024-11-11 10:19:56 +0900
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Branch: REL_16_STABLE [67d28bd02] 2024-11-11 10:19:58 +0900
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Branch: REL_15_STABLE [d2c3e31c1] 2024-11-11 10:19:59 +0900
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Branch: REL_14_STABLE [e6c945476] 2024-11-11 10:20:01 +0900
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Branch: REL_13_STABLE [7b49707b7] 2024-11-11 10:20:02 +0900
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Branch: REL_12_STABLE [2a951ef0a] 2024-11-11 10:20:03 +0900
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-->
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<para>
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Make <application>libpq</application> discard error messages
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received during SSL or GSS protocol negotiation (Jacob Champion)
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<ulink url="&commit_baseurl;2a951ef0a">&sect;</ulink>
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</para>
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<para>
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An error message received before encryption negotiation is completed
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might have been injected by a man-in-the-middle, rather than being
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real server output. Reporting it opens the door to various security
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hazards; for example, the message might spoof a query result that a
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careless user could mistake for correct output. The best answer
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seems to be to discard such data and rely only
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on <application>libpq</application>'s own report of the connection
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failure.
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</para>
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<para>
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The <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> Project thanks
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Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.
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(CVE-2024-10977)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<!--
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Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
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Branch: master [5a2fed911] 2024-11-11 10:29:54 -0500
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Branch: REL_17_STABLE [cd82afdda] 2024-11-11 10:29:54 -0500
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Branch: REL_16_STABLE [ae340d031] 2024-11-11 10:29:54 -0500
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Branch: REL_15_STABLE [a5d2e6205] 2024-11-11 10:29:54 -0500
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Branch: REL_14_STABLE [2a68808e2] 2024-11-11 10:29:54 -0500
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Branch: REL_13_STABLE [76123ded6] 2024-11-11 10:29:54 -0500
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Branch: REL_12_STABLE [4c9d96f74] 2024-11-11 10:29:54 -0500
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Branch: master [73c9f91a1] 2024-11-11 17:05:53 -0500
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Branch: REL_17_STABLE [f4f5d27d8] 2024-11-11 17:05:53 -0500
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Branch: REL_16_STABLE [95f5a5237] 2024-11-11 17:05:53 -0500
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Branch: REL_15_STABLE [109a32380] 2024-11-11 17:05:53 -0500
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Branch: REL_14_STABLE [00b94e8e2] 2024-11-11 17:05:53 -0500
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Branch: REL_13_STABLE [dc7378793] 2024-11-11 17:05:53 -0500
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Branch: REL_12_STABLE [0edad8654] 2024-11-11 17:05:53 -0500
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-->
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<para>
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Fix unintended interactions between <command>SET SESSION
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AUTHORIZATION</command> and <command>SET ROLE</command> (Tom Lane)
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<ulink url="&commit_baseurl;4c9d96f74">&sect;</ulink>
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<ulink url="&commit_baseurl;0edad8654">&sect;</ulink>
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</para>
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<para>
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The SQL standard mandates that <command>SET SESSION
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AUTHORIZATION</command> have a side-effect of doing <command>SET
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ROLE NONE</command>. Our implementation of that was flawed,
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creating more interaction between the two settings than intended.
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Notably, rolling back a transaction that had done <command>SET
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SESSION AUTHORIZATION</command> would revert <literal>ROLE</literal>
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to <literal>NONE</literal> even if that had not been the previous
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state, so that the effective user ID might now be different from
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what it had been before the transaction. Transiently
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setting <varname>session_authorization</varname> in a
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function <literal>SET</literal> clause had a similar effect.
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A related bug was that if a parallel worker
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inspected <literal>current_setting('role')</literal>, it
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saw <literal>none</literal> even when it should see something else.
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</para>
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<para>
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The <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> Project thanks
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Tom Lane for reporting this problem.
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(CVE-2024-10978)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<!--
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Author: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
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Branch: master [b7e3a52a8] 2024-11-11 06:23:43 -0800
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Branch: REL_17_STABLE [3ebcfa54d] 2024-11-11 06:23:46 -0800
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Branch: REL_16_STABLE [8fe3e697a] 2024-11-11 06:23:47 -0800
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Branch: REL_15_STABLE [e530835c6] 2024-11-11 06:23:47 -0800
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Branch: REL_14_STABLE [d15ec27c9] 2024-11-11 06:23:47 -0800
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Branch: REL_13_STABLE [e428cd058] 2024-11-11 06:23:48 -0800
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Branch: REL_12_STABLE [2ab12d860] 2024-11-11 06:23:48 -0800
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Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
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Branch: REL_14_STABLE [f89bd92c9] 2024-11-11 10:42:32 -0500
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Branch: REL_13_STABLE [6bccd7b03] 2024-11-11 10:42:32 -0500
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Branch: REL_12_STABLE [b1e58defb] 2024-11-11 10:42:32 -0500
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Branch: master [a34c33fd2] 2024-11-11 12:20:08 -0500
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Branch: REL_17_STABLE [4cd4f3b97] 2024-11-11 12:20:08 -0500
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Branch: REL_16_STABLE [88269df4d] 2024-11-11 12:20:08 -0500
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Branch: REL_16_STABLE [168579e23] 2024-11-11 12:27:06 -0500
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Author: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
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Branch: REL_16_STABLE [c335264c9] 2024-11-11 10:55:18 -0800
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Branch: REL_15_STABLE [16ed4f4d0] 2024-11-11 10:56:05 -0800
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Branch: REL_14_STABLE [c1fff7b1b] 2024-11-11 10:56:09 -0800
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Branch: REL_13_STABLE [9f97c31c2] 2024-11-11 10:56:12 -0800
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Branch: REL_12_STABLE [1e457468f] 2024-11-11 10:56:14 -0800
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Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
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Branch: master [c4252c9ef] 2024-11-11 13:57:21 -0500
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Branch: REL_17_STABLE [8d19f3fea] 2024-11-11 13:57:21 -0500
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Branch: REL_16_STABLE [64df88700] 2024-11-11 13:57:40 -0500
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Branch: REL_15_STABLE [c834b375a] 2024-11-11 13:57:41 -0500
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Branch: REL_14_STABLE [256e34653] 2024-11-11 13:57:41 -0500
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Branch: REL_13_STABLE [0bd9560d9] 2024-11-11 13:57:41 -0500
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Branch: REL_12_STABLE [9fc1c3a02] 2024-11-11 13:57:41 -0500
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-->
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<para>
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Prevent trusted PL/Perl code from changing environment variables
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(Andrew Dunstan, Noah Misch)
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<ulink url="&commit_baseurl;2ab12d860">&sect;</ulink>
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<ulink url="&commit_baseurl;b1e58defb">&sect;</ulink>
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<ulink url="&commit_baseurl;1e457468f">&sect;</ulink>
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<ulink url="&commit_baseurl;9fc1c3a02">&sect;</ulink>
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</para>
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<para>
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The ability to manipulate process environment variables such
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as <literal>PATH</literal> gives an attacker opportunities to
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execute arbitrary code. Therefore, <quote>trusted</quote> PLs must
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not offer the ability to do that. To fix <literal>plperl</literal>,
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replace <varname>%ENV</varname> with a tied hash that rejects any
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modification attempt with a warning.
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Untrusted <literal>plperlu</literal> retains the ability to change
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the environment.
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</para>
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<para>
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The <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> Project thanks
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Coby Abrams for reporting this problem.
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(CVE-2024-10979)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<!--
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Author: Álvaro Herrera <alvherre@alvh.no-ip.org>
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Branch: master [a90bdd7a4] 2024-08-08 19:35:13 -0400
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Branch: REL_17_STABLE Release: REL_17_0 [344f9f5e2] 2024-08-08 19:35:13 -0400

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