Abstract
This chapter studies the historical case of Themistocles to contradict the current “structural orthodoxy” that regards leaders as either theoretically immeasurable or heavily conditioned actors that lack transformative agency. Specifically, we use the case of Themistocles to illustrate six interrelated causal mechanisms that lucidly link both leadership and strategic agency to international outcomes. We argue that leaders may indeed have a consequential and measurable impact upon strategic issues, such as the diagnosis of national threats, the generation of domestic power resources, military organization and reform, alliance formation and alliance management, the outcome of wars, and ultimately the very distribution of power in the international system. As Themistocles’ case study provides both a hard test and an extreme test regarding the impact of leadership upon strategy, it demonstrates quite paradigmatically that leadership can generate power, affect power differentials among states, and ultimately reshape the international balance of power—that is, change the very polarity of the international system. We hope that a structured, analytical study of Themistoclean leadership will not only demonstrate the historical pivotal contributions of Themistocles to the salvation of Greece and the Occident, but also “bring leadership back in” to the study of international politics and help drive a new and rigorous “leadership-centric” theoretical investigation in the discipline.
A king sate on the rocky brow
Which looks o’er sea-born Salamis;
And ships, by thousands, lay below,
And men in nations; — all were his!
He counted them at break of day —
And when the sun set where were they?
Lord Byron: The Isles of Greece
The authors are very much indebted to Ariel Levite, Charles Maier, Elias Kastritis, Harris Mylonas, Kenneth Pollack, Leonard Hochberg, Louis Devine, Luke Cavanaugh and Paul Rahe for providing an extraordinarily insightful and stimulating feedback on earlier drafts of this chapter. The authors would like to dedicate this chapter in loving memory of Nana Vraila. Nana had an indefatigable spirit of inquiry about classical strategy and leadership. She was an avid reader of Thucydides and keen admirer of Themistocles whose relevance for our times she never ceased to embrace.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Carlyle (1888).
- 3.
Notice the stark contrast with management studies and business school curricula where leadership constitutes an essential part.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Quoted in Isaacson (1992).
- 7.
On case study selection in IR, see George and Bennett (2005).
- 8.
Byaman and Pollack (2001).
- 9.
Briant (2002).
- 10.
Themistocles worked astutely within the democratic polity. See Green (1998, 47–49).
- 11.
Foster (2010, 102).
- 12.
Thucydides 1.93–4.
- 13.
Thucydides 1.138.
- 14.
Constantine Cavafy, “But the wise perceive things about to happen”, The Canon, available online, https://www.onassis.org/initiatives/cavafy-archive/the-canon/but-the-wise-perceive-things-about-to-happen
- 15.
Plutarch, Themistocles, 3.
- 16.
Grundy (1948).
- 17.
The impact of leadership on power distribution is something that Yan Xuetong has recently framed in his Xunzi inspired leadership-centric theory of international relations, going as far as to support that leadership can even shape the polarity of the international system. The case of Themistocles—drawing from the Hellenic strategic corpus—adds an important attestation to Yan’s Sino-centric hypothesis and demonstrates that the consequentiality of leadership transcends cultural specificities. Also see Platias and Trigkas (2022, forthcoming).
- 18.
Byaman and Pollack (2001).
- 19.
Another way to evaluate the radical success of Themistocles leadership and stress the fact that this case constitutes both a hard and an extreme case for the study of leadership is by “structuring the force fields in which Themistocles acted.” Force field analysis investigates forces that are either “driving movement toward a goal (helping forces) or blocking movement toward a goal (hindering forces).” The hindering forces for Themistocles were powerful. The “balance of power” was against change and extremely pro-status quo. Athenian strategic culture was based on “hoplite agrarianism”, and although Athens was democratic (since the great reforms of Cleisthenes), the influence of the Aristocrats remained strong. Moreover, since Athenian hoplites had defeated the Persian expeditionary force at Marathon in 490 BCE incentives for military reform were extremely weak. Themistocles’ strategy to turn Athens to the sea espoused a radically “countercultural goal” and confronted powerful vested interests. Leadership singularly prevailed over all hindering forces. For the foundational work in field theory, see Lewin and Cartwright (1951).
- 20.
This complex approach remained central in the theorization of classical realists through the ages from Machiavelli to E. H. Carr to Morgenthau. In fact the latest calibration of the classical realist school, the so-called “Neoclassical Realism” school is built upon this complex engagement with all three levels of analysis. It subordinated parsimony to higher explanatory capacity. For a representative work, see Lobell et al. (2009).
- 21.
Platias and Koliopoulos (2010).
- 22.
Note that Thucydides also evaluated the impact of domestic politics on grand strategy arguing in support of the Spartan system. He thus described all three levels of analysis, hence he had been a complex realist—classical realist. Daniel Garst has used the term “neorealist appropriation” to frame the overly structural engagement of modern IR theorists with Thucydides’ work. See Garst (1989). Also see Grundy (1948).
- 23.
Byaman and Pollack (2001).
- 24.
Platias and Trigkas (2021).
- 25.
Xuetong (2020).
- 26.
Herodotus, 1.5.
- 27.
For an interesting study on transformative leadership investigating the case of Themistocles’ “intellectual” successor, see Menaldo (2013).
- 28.
So immense were the resources of Xerxes that Herodotus argues that a thrilled spectator seeing Xerxes crossing the Hellespont thought that almighty Zeus had disguised himself to Xerxes. Herodotus, 7.56.
- 29.
Thucydides 1.138.
- 30.
Thorley (1996).
- 31.
- 32.
Herodotus 7.139.
- 33.
Green (1998, 4).
- 34.
Hanson (2006, 51).
- 35.
On the impact of leadership on choosing the right means to resist an invasion and deciding on a doctrine, the case of the Britain before WWII that underinvested in armored vehicles and overinvested in bombers (strategic airpower) is quite revealing. This mistake pushed Britain to the brink and may have contributed to the German offensive against France. See Roth (2010).
- 36.
- 37.
Herodotus 7.144.
- 38.
Thucydides 1.138; Buchanan (1962, 8–9).
- 39.
- 40.
- 41.
Green (1998, 52).
- 42.
Roth (2010).
- 43.
Wallinga (1993, 141–142).
- 44.
- 45.
For a modern IR approach to underblancing, see Schweller (2008).
- 46.
Cunnigham FS, Review of “The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control and the Cold War”, H-Diplo, Nov. 2021, available online: https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/8889698/h-diplo-roundtable-xxiii-11-rittenhouse-green%C2%A0-revolution-failed#_Toc86942308
- 47.
Aristotle, The Constitution of Athens; Frost (1968, 111–112).
- 48.
Hanson (1999, 48–50).
- 49.
Gabrielsen (1994, 24–38).
- 50.
Note how the strategic concept of civil-military fusion remains central even in the modern interstate system with the US perfecting it and China as well as other states opting to emulate it. See Trigkas (2017).
- 51.
Lambert (2018). This is a clear case of leadership shaping strategic culture too.
- 52.
Plutarch, Themistocles, 4. Of course the latter part of Plutarch’s statement reflects the views of the landed Aristocrats who saw their political power declining after Themistocles naval reforms.
- 53.
- 54.
Green (1998, 28).
- 55.
Economou (2022).
- 56.
As Pseudo-Xenophon put it, “the steersmen, the boatswains, the sub-boatswains, the look-out officers, and the shipwrights—these are the ones who impart strength to the city far more than the hoplites, the high-born, and the good men.” Pseudo-Xenophon (Old Oligarch), Constitution of the Athenians.
- 57.
One may think of the impact of the French revolution and the advent of the mass army through levée en masse. See Challener (1955).
- 58.
Hanson (2001, 57–59).
- 59.
For the discussion of the organizational and managerial complexities on manning a force of 200 tririmes, see in this volume Carl H. Lyttkens and Henrik Gerding, “Copying with Chronic Warfare: The Athenian Experience”.
- 60.
- 61.
- 62.
Plutarch, Themistocles, 6. Notice that the naval grand strategy and the builtup of the navy was crucial in supporting Themistocles external balancing strategy. In an archipelagic environment, naval power was crucial for power projection and the establishment of security guarantees. The Delian league that Athens lead at the end of the Persian wars could not have been formed without Athenian Naval primacy.
- 63.
Plutarch, Themistocles, 6.
- 64.
At the time the conversation took place the Persian’s had already burnt Athens to the ground and the Athenians had fled and were thus “stateless.” Herodotus, 8.61. This incident highlights the inefficiency and the fragility of the allied command structure and the continuing inter-city strife within the Hellenic alliance that Themistocles had to constantly manage with care.
- 65.
In fact, in the Heliad, the foundational epic of Hellenic civilization, the struggle for prestige between Achilles and Agamenmnon drives the narrative of the Greek inability to fight united. The search for glory and recognition was central in the Hellenic cultural code.
- 66.
Quoted in Byaman and Pollack (2001, 128).
- 67.
Herodotus 8.61.
- 68.
Herodotus 8.62.
- 69.
“If Themistocles did not draft the second oracle himself, he surely dictated its contents”. According to Rahe (2019, 197). As Kautilya put it, “Those priests in charge of interpreting omens must make certain that dreams and other signs are always favorable to the king’s efforts and unfavorable to the enemy.”
- 70.
He applied smart stratagems to persuade the Athenians. He had the holy serpent of Athena taken secretly to the beach and then argued that that was a divine omen for the people to board the ships and abandon the city. Plutarch, 10.
- 71.
- 72.
Garland (2017).
- 73.
Platias (2020).
- 74.
Strauss (2005).
- 75.
Hanson (1999, 89–104).
- 76.
Note however that once the fleet of the 200 tririmes was built Themistocles had done its best to train the Athenian navy men and he himself designed and oversaw the naval exercises and gymnasia. See Rahe (2015, 197–198).
- 77.
- 78.
Cawkwell (2005).
- 79.
Herodotus, 8.60A.
- 80.
Herodotus, 8.60B.
- 81.
- 82.
Diodorus Siculus, [11, 17]. As Charles Maier said to the authors: “I hadn’t realized that Themistocles had hedged his bets, but you are right: part of leadership is minimizing the role that chance can play. Still, there will always be some role left, call it perhaps the aleatory minimum.” Note that this stratagem is found in Sun Tzu. Misleading information can be ‘fed’ to the enemy through “expendable agents” who are deliberately provided with false information and are then allowed to be captured by the adversary. See Handel (2005, 167).
- 83.
Aeschylus, Persians, pp. 400–32.
- 84.
Herodotus, 8.22.
- 85.
Diodorus Sicullus, 11.19.
- 86.
Sun Tzu (2020, Chap. 7).
- 87.
Cornelius Nepos, Lives of Eminent Commanders, 5; Diodorus Siculus, 2.4.
- 88.
Churchill (2014).
- 89.
Even before the battle of Salamis, Themistocles had promised to the Athenians that with his strategy Athens would soon “induce the Hellenes to yield willing obedience to the Athenians.” Plutarch, Themistocles, 5.
- 90.
Thucydides 1.93.
- 91.
Thucydides 1.93.
- 92.
Rahe (2019, 24–33).
- 93.
Thucydides 1.90.
- 94.
Thucydides, 1.93.
- 95.
Ibid.
- 96.
Hanson (2014).
- 97.
See Pseudo Xenophon (Old oligarch); Foster (2010).
- 98.
See Foster (2010, 97–105).
- 99.
Walling (2013).
- 100.
Plutarch, Themistocles; Thucydides 1.95–6.
- 101.
Thucydides 1.89. To be sure, Athenian supremacy in the new alliance established after the end of the Persian wars was now deemed necessary by Themistocles in order to avoid the problems of the chaotic command structure that he encountered in Salamis. As we argued previously in this chapter these problems endangered the efforts of the Hellenic alliance during the 480 BCE Persian invasion.
- 102.
Thucydides 1.75.
- 103.
This is because the Spartans foresaw that if they were to become a naval state their socioeconomic system would have to drastically reform too. Spartan elites could not dare risk that eventuality. In fact Spartans had often treated with mistrust leaders with reformist potential. From Pausanias to Brasidas to Lysander to Gylipos. Notice how the rigid polity of Sparta (the second image) affected its grand strategy. That takes us back to our introductory comment about complexity and classical realism. This is aptly captured in a anectode that Plutarch mentions that when a man from Seriphos attempted to devalue the accomplishment of Themistocles by attributing his glory to the greateness of Athens, Themistocles replied, “you speak the truth; I should never have been famous if I had been of Seriphos; nor you, had you been of Athens.” Plutarch, Themistocles, 18. Themistocles’ remark raises the issue of “reciprocal determinism,” that is, a bidirectional causal relationship between an established political order and humans acting within that order. As we have demonstrated in this chapter, Themistocles shaped the Athenian domestic polity (second image) but it’s also true that the open Athenian political system (which leaders such as Solon and Cleisthenes drastically shaped) that preceded Themistocles made it possible for a non-socially privileged citizen born by an non-Athenian mother to rise, based on his skills and ambition, to the top leadership position.
- 104.
On this nature of naval power to be self-reinforcing, see Thucydides 1.96; Pseudo Xenophon; de Romilly (1963).
- 105.
In fact Athens ousted Persia from the Black sea, Asia Minor, and Cyprus. It took 80 years for Persia to recover these territories.
- 106.
Thucydides 1.93.
- 107.
Jaffe (2022).
- 108.
Ibid.
- 109.
Diodorus 11.58; Smith (2021, xxvii).
- 110.
Rood (2016).
- 111.
His political enemies had refered to this action and to alleged letters by Pausanias to implicate Themistocles in treason against Greece. Yet, as Thucydides makes clear when Themistocles dispatched his servant to urge Xerxes to hurry and return to Persia he lied that the Greek forces would soon block the Persian king’s return by undertaking a blockade of the Hellespont. The Greeks had no sufficient forces to organize the complete blockage of the Hellespont, let alone project sufficient maritime power in northern Greece during winter while Persian infantry was still in Attica. With that stratagem Themistocles deceived Xerxes who instead of reorganizing his formidable military forces in Greece for a counterstrike after Salamis, he rushed back to Persia with his elite units. In this way Themistocles further divided the Persian forces and significantly contributed to the final victory of the Greeks in the Battle of Plataea.
- 112.
Thucydides 1.137.
- 113.
Plutarch, Life of Themistocles, 28. That admiration of the Persian King for Themistocles intensified the preexisted hatred of the Persian court against the great Athenian. Diodorus Sicullus, 11.57.
- 114.
- 115.
Thucydides 2.60.
- 116.
There is a highly innacurate depiction of Themistocles as corruptible and prone to bribing spread by his political opponents. We have no evidence that Themistocles sacrificed the interests of his city to treasoneously enrich himself. After all, Themistocles had become independently wealthy by practicing his craft as a top legal counsel and was a highly sought impartial arbitrator. Plutarch, Themistocles, 4. Also see Jaffe (2022).
- 117.
For a psychological portait of Themistocles, see Connor (1992, 54–55). Our hypothesis to be explored in future work is that Themistocles had direct exposure to the works of early sophists (teachers of wisdom as they were called) and thus part of his strategic intelligence derived from his sophist-based education. Plutarch mentions that “Themistocles was a disciple of Mnesiphilus the Phrearrhian” who was a Sophist. Plutarch, Themistocles, 2; Gagarin, 2002, 26; O’Grady, 2008, 154–155). For the importance of the Sophist movement in Athen’s political life, see de Romilly (1988).
- 118.
Hanson (2006).
- 119.
- 120.
See Jaffe (2022).
- 121.
Lenardon R (1978, 126–138).
- 122.
Plutarch, Themistocles, 2.
- 123.
The Satrapy by Constantinos P. Cavafy. See Cavafy (1975).
- 124.
The Giaour by Lord Byron. See Lord Byron (1841).
- 125.
That was the title of the late Robert Jervis lecture at the 2020 Themistocles prize virtual ceremony. See: https://www.des.unipi.gr/events/event/themistocles-award-2021.
- 126.
Thucydides 1.138.
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Platias, Α., Trigkas, V. (2022). Themistocles: Leadership and Grand Strategy. In: Economou, E.M., Kyriazis, N.C., Platias, A. (eds) Democracy and Salamis. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-98431-1_5
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